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A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE APPLICATION OF 
BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
MANAGEMENT  
 
Kensuke Ito (The University of Tokyo), 
Marcus O’Dair (Middlesex University) 
 
This chapter critically investigates the application of blockchain technology for intellectual property 
management. To date, there have been relatively few critical discussions of the feasibility of utilising 
blockchain technology for the management of intellectual property, although much has been written, in 
media and industry sources, about the potential. Our aim, by contrast, is to examine possible limitations - 
and, subsequently, to suggest tentative solutions to the limitations we identify. Specifically, this paper 
aims to examine the use of blockchain technology for intellectual property management from two 
perspectives: operation and implementation. We conclude that, while commentators often focus on 
technical characteristics of blockchain technology itself, it is the incentive design – which was 
fundamental to the original Bitcoin proposal – that is also critical to truly decentralised, and 
disintermediated, intellectual property management.  
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Below, we set out the major challenges related to managing intellectual property in the digital era, before 
going on to examine ways in which supporters have suggested that blockchain and distributed ledger 
technologies could contribute to solving these challenges. Key technical terms are also explained.  
 
Intellectual property management in the digital era  
 
‘Intellectual property’ (IP) refers to the protection of the application of ideas and information of 
commercial value (Cornish et al 2013, p. 6). Cornish et al (2013, p. 7) identify three central types of IP: 
‘patents for inventions, copyright for literary and artistic works and associated products, and trademarks 
and names for the goodwill attaching to marketing symbols’. This chapter focuses in particular on 
copyright: ‘a right given against the copying of defined types of cultural, informational and entertainment 
productions’ produced by authors, playwrights, composers, artists and film directors (Cornish et al 2013, 
p. 8). Copyright is conferred automatically to literary and artistic works but only when written down or 
recorded: critically, ‘it is the particular expression making up a work which is protected, rather than the 
idea behind it’ (Cornish et al 2013, 9).  
 
While digital technology is far from the first challenge to copyright, it may prove the most significant, 
since ‘digitisation has made unauthorised access and distribution of copyrighted work easy and ordinary’ 
(Klein et al 2015, p. 3). Indeed, some scholars have suggested that IP, as currently understood, may not 
survive the current era (Cornish et al 2013, p. 11). As Cornish et al (2013) assert, IP is essentially 
negative: although there may be positive entitlements, IP rights are primarily an attempt to prevent 
particular activities, such as piracy. In practical terms, however, lawsuits and threats have achieved 
limited results (Klein et al 2015, p. 31), since peer-to-peer file-sharing sites, for instance, have proved 
difficult to shut down. Digital technology has stretched copyright ‘to breaking point’, resulting in ‘a gulf 
between copyright law and everyday practices’ (Klein et al 2015, p. 1). There are problems with royalty 
payments, which are slow, inefficient and opaque, and it is difficult to assess whether labels, publishers or 
collection societies are processing payments efficiently (O’Dair et al 2016).  
 
The possible role of blockchain technology  
 
Some have suggested that a solution could lie in distributed ledger technologies (DLTs), such as 
blockchain technology. A ‘distributed ledger’ can be understood as a type of distributed database; its aim 
is to overcome the presence of malicious users or nodes (Hileman and Rauchs 2017, p. 11). A blockchain 
is a particular type of distributed ledger: one that is ‘composed of a chain of cryptographically linked 
“blocks” contained in batched transactions’ (Hileman and Rauchs 2017, p. 11).  
 
For reasons of space, we do not include a detailed discussion of the technical aspects of distributed ledger 
technology in this chapter; such information is readily available elsewhere (Nakamoto 2008; Buterin 
2014; Antonopoulos 2015; Swan 2015; Narayanan et al 2016). The pertinent point for this paper is that 
Bitcoin, proposed in 2008 and implemented the following year, was radical in its removal of third parties 
(in that instance, banks). Crucially, this disintermediation was achieved not only through technology but 
also through a deep understanding of game theory and incentives. However, Bitcoin can be understood as 
simply the first innovation in this space. Gupta (2017, p. 2) identifies subsequent innovations, of which 
the first is ‘the realisation that the underlying technology that operated bitcoin [the cryptocurrency] could 
be separated from the currency and used for all kinds of other interorganisational cooperation’. With this 
innovation came the understanding that blockchain technology, which, if not quite immutable, is certainly 
extremely robust since it has no single point of failure, could be utilised for more than bitcoin 
transactions. With ‘metacoins’ came the notion that bitcoins could be augmented, its functionality 
extended; with ‘altcoins’ came entirely new cryptocurrencies, and new blockchains. The subsequent 
innovation identified by Gupta, closely linked to one of these new blockchains, is the ‘smart contract’, 
‘embodied in a second-generation blockchain system called Ethereum, which built little computer 
programs directly into blockchain that allowed financial instruments, like loans or bonds, to be 
represented’, rather than only bitcoins (Gupta 2017, p. 2). A ‘smart contract’, then, is a self-executing 
computer programme that automatically performs a given function (Hileman and Rauchs 2017, p. 11). 
Smart contracts have enabled the emergence of DApps, or decentralised applications with backend code 
running on decentralised, peer-to-peer networks.  
 
While it is the global prominence, and fluctuating value, of bitcoin that has media headlines, Morabito 
(2017, p. vii) suggests, we should understand blockchain as more than a financial technology or ‘fintech’ 
phenomenon; it is being deployed in a range of domains and across a number of industries. Blockchain 
technology, in other words, can be used to as a register of intellectual property. In essence, this works 
through the use of ‘hashes’. A ‘hash’ is a unique string of alphanumeric characters that represents a given 
content file; it can be understood as a kind of ‘digital fingerprint’ (Antonopoulos 2015, p. xx). Crucially, 
it is short enough to be included in a blockchain transaction; ‘via the hash, the original file content has 
essentially been encoded into the blockchain’ (Swan 2015, p. 39).  
 
Proponents identify three advantages of blockchain technology for creating a distributed IP database 
(O’Dair and Beaven 2017). Firstly, they claim that it guarantees authenticity: metadata can be inextricably 
bound to the relevant data file, be it a song or a film. Secondly, proponents state that blockchain 
technology allows for provenance: usage and ownership can be recorded. Thirdly, champions of the 
blockchain state that it can facilitate the faster and more efficient payment of royalties, in some cases by 
removing trusted intermediaries and facilitating a direct-to-fan model. These advantages may seem 
compelling, and they are propounded by a number of start-ups, funded either by traditional venture 
capitalists or by means of token sales, also known as initial coin offerings or ICOs. A token sale can be 
akin to a Kickstarter-style crowdfunding campaign, which allows the general public to participate in an 
early-stage project; the important difference, however, is that most tokens are tradeable (Chen 2017). 
Token sales offer the possibility of raising significant sums of money at speed: millions of dollars can be 
raised in seconds, even by companies yet to produce a product (Sahdev 2017). At the same time, it is 
important to recognise that token sales vary wildly, with only a minority of tokens offering fractional 
ownership in the value of the underlying organisation (Conley 2017, p. 1).  
 
Having examined both the challenges of contemporary intellectual property management and the claims 
made for blockchain and distributed ledger technologies as a solution to these challenges, we now go on 
to critically examine limitations of the technology - first from an operational perspective, sub-divided into 
authenticity, provenance and royalty stability, and then from the perspective of implementation, sub-
divided into files, metadata and licensing.  
 
Review from an Operational Perspective  
 
This section covers potential problems of using blockchain technology for IP management from an 
operational perspective. Specifically, we here examine each use case in order, from simple to complex, 
and classify their limitations in terms of authenticity, provenance and royalty stability. Having identified a 
number of challenges, we then go on to suggest possible solutions which we could consider under a 
current environment.  
 
Authenticity problem  
 
In almost all blockchain-based intellectual property management systems, we first have to convert some 
IP information into a hash and record it in a distributed ledger. This is a relatively simple task but it is 
valuable in providing assurance that a protected work existed at a certain point in time (Proof of 
Existence) because blockchains are robust - even ‘immutable’.1 By adding information on rights holders, 
it would be possible to go a step beyond proof of existence - to what we might call Proof of Ownership.2 
A number of related services have already been proposed, such as a digital certificate that makes use of 
blockchain ‘timestamping’ (e.g. Binded) and a common protocol for IP metadata (e.g. Coala IP, SPOOL 
on Ascribe). However, a fundamental problem in this first step is that, for information that is not native to 
the blockchain, we cannot guarantee its authenticity at the moment of registration: this is sometimes 
referred to as the ‘garbage in, garbage out’ problem. If copyright ownership information is entered 
incorrectly, either deliberately (by a bad actor) or mistakenly (due to human error), it is unclear how 
conflicts would be resolved without a trusted third party (TTP). Although it can store information in a 
robust and immutable manner, blockchain technology alone cannot confirm the authenticity of the 
registered information.  
 
Unless and until we can address this authenticity problem, practical operations will be restricted to a 
public but permissioned network that can contain only information authorised by a TTP. This corresponds 
to the example of the academic journal, Ledger (http://ledgerjournal.org), where the process of reviewing 
submitted papers is recorded on a blockchain, rather than a centralised pre-print server. In this case, even 
though the data can be preserved in a secure environment, only the authorised editors are responsible for 
its input. If a solution requires governance by a TTP, it is not based on the innovation achieved by 
Bitcoin, and it also contradicts our goal of facilitating IP management by disintermediation.  
 
Provenance problem  
 
If, for the sake of argument, we assume the authenticity problem is somehow solved, the next challenge 
concerns recording transfers of ownership. There is an expectation that blockchain can facilitate the 
transfer of IP without requiring a TTP, and that it can overcome the problem of ‘piracy’ through issuing a 
digital certificate or a secret key to access digital contents (e.g. Ascribe, CopyrightBank). Here, however, 
we face another problem related to provenance: blockchain cannot prevent ‘double-spending’ and 
unauthorised replication outside the network (O’Dwyer 2017, p. 306). Physical assets such as paintings, 
for example, can easily be transferred between owners without updating the information stored in a 
ledger; moreover, even digital assets are replicable for a temporal owner who has the private key. 
Needless to say, once IP is transferred outside the network, records in the ledger no longer provide a 
reliable certificate of ownership.  
 
Until this provenance problem is solved, practical operations will be restricted to issuing transferable 
ownership certificates, where the rights to exclude unauthorised use depends not on blockchain but on the 
power of TTPs such as government representatives or collection societies. This corresponds to the 
example of the digital certificate (e.g. Ascribe) that embeds terms of service compliant with local laws in 
order to be used as evidence in court to resolve ownership disputes. As with authenticity, this solution 
would not contribute to the disintermediation and efficient IP management because it is costly to settle 
ownership disputes after the fact, by relying on a TTP, rather than preventing such problems beforehand 
by incentive design.  
 
Royalty stability problem  
 
If we assume both the authenticity and the provenance problems are solved, then disintermediated IP 
management would finally become feasible. As stated above, a number of intermediaries currently exist 
to monitor the secondary use of intellectual property, as manifest in both physical and digital works, and 
their high management costs diminish royalty payments to creators. In order to improve such a situation, a 
variety of online platforms are being developed that aim to directly connect artist and consumer by using 
blockchain to store royalty payment records in addition to contents transaction. This is evident especially 
in the music industry, where monitoring costs are high (e.g. Ujo Music, Peertracks, Bittunes.)3 However, 
one final challenge remains: we cannot use stable payment methods for decentralised royalty 
management. Although cryptocurrencies provided a new payment method that does not rely on a TTP, 
their price has thus far not been sufficiently stable as to use as a store of value. Instead, many 
cryptocurrencies are volatile in the extreme. It would be more practical for intellectual property 
management to use DApps,4 for instance on Ethereum; specifically the DApp could circulate internal 
reward tokens associated with ownership transfer and thereby manage the transactions of both IP 
ownership and royalty payments on the same network. However, this would make the royalties paid to 
artists even more unstable, because there is fluctuation in the value of reward tokens within the DApp, as 
well as at the Ethereum network level. 
 
As long as we cannot solve this royalty stability problem, practical operations will be restricted to a 
service whose royalty payment confronts the trade-off between efficiency and stability; we must accept 
significant price fluctuations in return for efficient payment with no intermediaries, or, conversely, must 
rely on costly intermediaries and legal currencies in return for stable royalty payments. Therefore, even if 
we could solve the problems of authenticity and provenance, the system needs to set an optimal boundary 
on to what extent royalty management should be decentralised in order to maximise royalty payments to 
creators.5  
 
Tentative solutions  
 
We have thus far investigated several use cases concerning IP management by blockchain technology, 
and have discussed three cumulative obstacles: authenticity, provenance and royalty stability. The 
consistent challenge is that IP is not native to the blockchain, and can have an independent value even 
outside the network.6 In the case of cryptocurrencies represented by Bitcoin, we can trace the precise 
history of transaction and issuance because the numbers recorded in the ledger serve as the only evidence 
of asset value. In the case of intellectual property, by contrast, we face a number of challenges in keeping 
IP data consistent with the actual asset, because the value of the asset exists separately from the ledger. In 
other words, DLT can make the data robust and immutable, but only once it is correctly registered - and it 
cannot accurately validate the condition of external entities. IP management may, then, need a new 
technology or incentive design which addresses assets with independent value, rather than simply 
applying to IP management a system developed for cryptocurrencies. How, then, can we overcome these 
challenges? Below, we consider some tentative solutions for each challenge in turn.  
 
As regards the authenticity problem, similar discussions have already been made in Oracle, a system that 
acquires information outside the blockchain network as a condition for executing smart contracts. If we 
consider the example of a prediction market, one of the most common applications of Oracle, users need 
to reach consensus on the outcome of predicted events (about weather, the stock market, sports matches 
and so on) in order to trigger payments. Thus, this shares the same challenge as intellectual property 
management: how to prove the input data are truly correct. While most of the implemented oracles adopt 
a centralised solution relying on a TTP (typically information providers), some propose a decentralised 
solution to the problem. For example, Peterson et al. (2018) describes a unique Oracle for Augur that 
delegates the outcome determination to some internal users or ‘reporters’. Reporters in this system are 
incentivised to act honestly by the mechanism that each reporter stakes tokens against an option they 
believe as most likely and then all staked tokens are redistributed to those reporters who chose the option 
consistent with consensus.7 In addition, Brey (2017) deals with an attempt to design a decentralised 
reputation network formed through token-based incentives and to trade the reputation data in its own 
Oracle for Tru. These approaches, namely token staking and reputation systems, will also be useful in 
addressing the authenticity problem for IP management, by helping to achieve decentralised consensus.  
 
The provenance problem could in part be solved by the fact that we have an incentive to maintain the 
chain of provenance to avoid decreasing the value of a given asset (De Filippi et al 2016, p. 5). 
Furthermore, the provenance problem could be addressed through tokenisation, a method that divides the 
value (or associated rights) of a work into tokens whose management can be internalised in the ledger. 
Unfortunately, effective tokenisation is currently limited to goods with a source of value that is traceable 
on the ledger or transferrable by tokens; the former corresponds to an example of online ticket (e.g. 
Aventus), while the latter corresponds to tokens issued in a creator’s name (e.g. Tokit on SingularDTV). 
In other words, even if an asset is tokenised under the status quo, this will not overcome the provenance 
problem without the existence of TTP, because IP can still be copied or double-assigned behind the token 
holders’ back. Nevertheless, tokenisation has a great potential to solve this problem, in two broad ways. 
In the first scenario, which we might call the internal method, the tokens denote IP rights; this method 
represents an attempt to make IP rights traceable, and could be successful as long as we can prove the 
connection of value between tokens and creative works8. The second scenario is the external use of 
tokens, in which tokens are a form of compensation, or reward, for creators of IP. This is an approach to 
mitigate the provenance problem by incentivising creators even when works are not protected by 
exclusive copyright; anyone can freely access and copy them. Externalisation therefore has a synergy 
with digital content which we can duplicate with almost no additional costs. For example, Everpedia, a 
kind of decentralised Wikipedia, already issues tokens to users who contribute by editing articles, and 
Steemit adopts a similar reward system towards blog posts and their evaluation.  
 
Regarding the royalty stability problem, a straightforward but effective solution would be to adopt 
‘pegged cryptocurrencies’, whose value is backed by stable assets. Tether, Nubit and BitUSD, for 
example, are examples of cryptocurrencies pegged to US dollars, and there is also a project to issue the 
tokens pegged with gold like DigixDAO. These attempts can bring both value stabilisation and efficiency 
to payment methods. In particular, the Dai Stablecoin System by MakerDAO is noteworthy in that it aims 
to stabilise token prices in a decentralised manner. The system uses two main protocols in order to 
achieve stabilisation without a TTP holding vast amounts of US Dollars in reserve: users have to deposit 
an appropriate amount of ether as collateral before issuing a token, and the amount is calculated based on 
the price of US Dollars acquired from the outside by the distributed Oracle. Since this token allows an 
integrated application to maintain the characteristics as DApps, the Dai Stablecoin System will be 
effective on the stable and disintermediated IP royalty management.  
 
Review from an Implementation Perspective  
In this section, we investigate the methods and challenges of blockchain-based applications for IP from an 
implementation perspective. This is important because a system for efficient IP management generally 
requires the implementation of multiple service layers, each with a different method for decentralisation. 
For simplicity, we here divide the layers into three: files, metadata and licensing. We examine these three 
layers in turn, in each case analysing examples of existing services.  
 
Files layer  
 
When implementing a system aiming for disintermediation of IP management, the most fundamental 
layer we can consider decentralising would be file storage: the layer that contains original digital content 
such as music, movies and images. Before the emergence of blockchain technology, decentralisation of 
this layer can be understood as essentially an extension of the use of peer-to-peer file sharing systems for 
the high-speed transfer of large volume data. Resilio Sync (formerly BitTorrent Sync), for example, 
provided a system to synchronise files in local storage among multiple devices based on BitTorrent – one 
of the most popular peer-to-peer file transfer protocols. More recently, Benet (2014) extended this idea to 
a browser-based file system named IPFS (InterPlanetary File System) and proposed a web page that 
works even without a server. However, these systems themselves lack Bitcoin’s unique incentive design – 
only more recently have they started to integrate token-based rewarding to promote the autonomous 
working of the distributed storage network. Nodes in these new systems all lend and borrow their storage 
space via tokens and store the hash values of segmented data as Merkle tree format along with the original 
data, but the methods are slightly different to prove without a TTP that the data are correctly stored.9 For 
example, Storj is designed to reward the storage provider if he/she can return a hash value consistent with 
the regular requests by clients, and the Merkle tree of hashes is preserved in the Ethereum blockchain 
(Wilkinson et al. 2016).10 In Sia, while the storage provider similarly obtains reward tokens when he/she 
successfully returns a valid hash list of a part of the stored data in predetermined frequency, the Merkle 
tree is preserved in its original proof-of-work blockchain (Vorick and Champine 2014). Furthermore, 
Filecoin, proposed for usage with IPFS, links storage proof and the influence over its original blockchain: 
a node can generate the next block with a higher probability if it is proved to store the client's data for a 
specified time (Protocol Labs 2017).  
 
With these systems, creators will be able to store original IP data in an environment that is neither entirely 
self-contained nor dependent upon a TTP. On the other hand, we can point out two main problems with 
regard to decentralising the files layer. Firstly, the decentralisation of the files layer does not make a very 
significant contribution to the goal of efficient IP management through disintermediation. Most of the 
argument on inefficiency has been made against a number of intermediaries for the management of IP 
rights and royalties, not for the storage of original files. Considering that we also need additional costs 
(tokens) in order for the file storage to function autonomously, it would be more reasonable in many cases 
to use existing services relying on TTP such as cloud storage, rather than attempt to decentralise this 
layer.11 Secondly, as far as the authors know, all peer-to-peer storage systems with Bitcoin-inspired 
incentive design (e.g. IPFS with Filecoin) are currently under development, so that there are no practical 
applications for IP management based on them. Although implementation plans have often been 
announced in the music industry, for instance, we are not aware at the time of writing this chapter of any 
projects that have successfully achieved decentralisation of the files layer.12 The risks and benefits of 
using such new file storage systems, therefore, remain uncertain.  
 
Metadata layer  
 
Many applications use the database management system (DBMS) for efficient data control. Unlike 
storage and file systems, such a database generally stores the structured metadata which correspond to the 
original data, and DBMS frees us from the programming task for stipulating data location and access 
authority. This convenient middleware is adopted for IP management as well – for example, the metadata 
of registration rights such as trademarks and patents are all published on the database by management 
authorities (e.g. EUIPO, EPO). Decentralisation of this layer has already been popular as distributed 
databases which were implemented for the main purpose of resolving the large-scale data management 
problems by making distributed processing easier and more efficient (Özsu and Valduriez 2011, p. 3). 
Blockchain technology is, as Hileman and Rauchs (2017, p. 11) stated, often referred to as distributed 
ledger technology (DLT) while being treated as a kind of distributed database. This is to emphasise 
several different aspects of blockchain, such that it is decentralised for robustness, rather than efficiency, 
and is proposed originally as a component of the peer-to-peer system that did not assume central 
management (Nakamoto 2008, Pinna and Ruttenberg 2016). It would be a natural approach to apply such 
blockchain-specific characteristics to existing distributed database management system (DDBMS). For 
example, BigchainDB aims to balance scalability and decentralized management through a hybrid method 
that the system uses DDBMS for both data storage and transaction recording,13 while the communication 
between them requires the voting by the group of assigned nodes.14 BigchainDB has especially a potential 
to have an influence on the future of IP management since it is being developed by many of the same 
individuals who developed Ascribe, a company dealing with digital certificates for IP ownership.15  
 
The point we would like to make here is that existing distributed databases can achieve much of what can 
be achieved by blockchains. For example, as with other append-only databases, CouchDB can make data 
uneditable once inputted, while Apache Cassandra eliminates single points of failure from its network by 
peer-to-peer data management based on consistent hashing.16 Considering that we can ensure something 
approaching immutability and a reasonable degree of robustness even in existing mechanisms, the new 
achievement by blockchain (in combination with proper incentive design) would be limited to the 
decentralised and autonomous management of the data recorded on the ledger by people with different 
interests. However, this has not yet been completely realised in a general-purpose DBMS. Even in 
BigchainDB, clients need to trust the nodes and the consortium as long as its consensus depends on the 
voting system. Other barriers to creating a decentralised autonomous management still remain too, such 
as the aforementioned authenticity problem and the Sybil attack problem, a risk typically faced by online 
voting. Therefore, we need to be cautious in claiming blockchain technology can transform the metadata 
layer – not only in the case of IP management.  
 
Licensing layer  
 
A significant proportion of the blockchain-based IP management applications we introduced in the 
previous section intend to record the transfer of the rights and values accompanying the registered 
contents. Such a layer for storing the history of status transition of the target files or metadata is referred 
here to as the licensing layer. A number of applications are being developed in this layer, because 
licensing is one of the most explicit extensions to the core concept of Bitcoin – a peer-to-peer transfer of 
the data stored in the ledger. In case of performing a simple Proof of Existence and certificate transfer, it 
would be sufficient to store the hash value corresponding to creative work in the Bitcoin blockchain (e.g. 
Ascribe, poex.io).17 However, in order to execute wider and more flexible functions, including licensing 
and payment, we need to use blockchain as a platform which is able to develop DApps. In Ethereum, for 
instance, we can realise behaviors much more diverse and complicated than those required for a coin 
transaction by the following two sequential methods: creating a transaction to define and deploy a 
'contract account' equivalent to an object in the context of programming, and sending another type of 
transaction containing the variables necessary for contract execution to the defined account (Buterin 2014, 
pp. 13-17). It should be emphasised that Ethereum blockchain does not hold the files or metadata; it 
recorded only the state transition of both user18 and contract accounts. Accordingly, at least under the 
existing circumstances, a single blockchain cannot manage IP consistently from original file storage to 
license transfer.  
 
The fact that a number of projects are being developed on the licensing layer suggests a confidence that 
implementation challenges can be overcome; certainly, the challenges are mild compared to those 
presented by the files and metadata layers. The real challenge in decentralising royalty management is to 
integrate licensing with these files and metadata layers - yet existing DApps focus on the licensing layer 
alone. In IP management, Ujo Music is an example of a platform attempting to address this issue: the 
company plans to decentralise multiple layers, including the licensing layer. In addition, needless to say, 
the problems from the operational perspective that we have discussed in the previous chapter still remain. 
Provenance and royalty stability are especially critical issues that should be dealt with through the design 
of the licensing layer, since we cannot solve them even if original files or metadata guarantee authenticity. 
Despite these challenges, licensing is the layer where application development is so active as to have a 




The excitement surrounding the potential of blockchain technology for managing IP is understandable. 
Yet existing blockchain design, which is optimised for cryptocurrencies, should not and cannot be simply 
applied to the management of IP, since assets are not native to the blockchain. Significant operational 
challenges remain. As regards authenticity, we must address the ‘garbage in, garbage out’ problem. As 
regards provenance, we must consider our inability to prevent off-chain transfers. As regards royalty 
stability, finally, we must face the challenge of cryptocurrency volatility. Tentatively, we have suggested 
ways in which the various operational challenges might be overcome. for instance through the use of 
token-based incentives, and through pegging cryptocurrencies to fiat currencies. There are also, however, 
challenges from an implementation perspective - at the file, metadata and licensing layers. We are, as yet, 
not aware of use cases for the decentralisation of the file layer, so talk of using blockchains for managing 
actual files remains somewhat abstract. As regards metadata, the case for the use of blockchains as 
opposed to other forms of distributed database has yet to be made. As regards licensing, finally, we are 
not as yet aware of a single blockchain that can manage IP consistently from original file storage to 
license transfer.  
 
It is also important to note that, even if we overcome the barriers to adoption identified in this chapter, not 
to mention additional concerns relating from the technical (scalability) to the legal and regulatory, the use 
of blockchains for IP management is not without risk: ‘smart contracts’ could replicate the worst aspects 
of digital rights management (De Filippi et al 2016, p. 3), while the censorship-resistance of distributed 
systems could make it very difficult to remove illegal content (O’Dair 2017, p. 22). Finally, not all 
commentators agree that the use of distributed ledgers for the management of IP necessarily results in a 
decentralisation of power in the interests of creators: for Zeilinger (2016), decentralised technologies will, 
on the contrary, simply reinforce models of centralised finance. Further examination of such risks is 
beyond the scope of this chapter, but the need for further research is clear.  
 
The conclusion of our own research is that blockchain is a highly innovative technology that could 
transform the management of IP. A narrow focus on the technology itself, however, can result in a tech-
utopian ‘solutionism’ that ignores significant challenges from both operational and implementation 
perspectives. The effective use of blockchain technology for IP management will be dependent upon the 
proper design of incentives, at both operational and implementation layers. The incentive structure, after 
all, is precisely what was so innovative about Nakamoto’s original proposal back in 2008. We should not 





1 More precisely, blockchain is pseudo-immutable because the accumulation of sequential blocks just 
makes tampering difficult (not impossible) through computational complexity, and we can rollback the 
stored record when blockchain is managed by a TTP.   
2 This extension has a novelty in that we can prove existence or ownership without disclosing the data on 
the contents by adopting a hash function.  
3 At the time of writing, the authors are not aware of platforms that have decentralised all three layers 
identified in the implementation section below.   
4 Decentralised applications: an app with the backend code running on a decentralised peer-to-peer 
network, rather than a centralised server.  
5 Note also that the realisation of decentralised payments needs additional fees as an incentive to the 
validators, such as transaction fees on Bitcoin and GAS on Ethereum. Thus, more precisely, we need to 
consider this cost as well as the price fluctuation risk in order for artist's royalty maximisation.   
6 We therefore can apply the three problems to other assets that have similar characteristics, such as real 
estate, jewellery and even supply chain management.  
7 See original paper for more details of the consensus including dispute round. Although it is not 
explicitly mentioned in the original paper, Augur's Oracle is often called as "distributed fact stream".  
8 Note that there are some projects trying to tokenise the external (non-native to the blockchain) assets by 
assuming a TTP responsible for custody of the assets (e.g. Latoken). Although this is partially contrary to 
the elimination of intermediaries, it will make a certain contribution to the provenance problem and the 
liquidity on the registered assets.  
9 Additionally, the approaches for redundancy (a design to handle the situation that a part of nodes is off-
line) are also slightly different. See each whitepaper in detail. 
10 Storj changed its underlying blockchain from that of Bitcoin to that of Ethereum in 2017.  
11 It should also be noted that while the decentralisation of storage layer will reduce the risk of data loss, it 
does not solve the problems of authenticity and provenance.   
12 For example, Ujo Music is now using Amazon S3 while developers mentioned future implementation 
of decentralised (and autonomous) storage systems.  
13 The latter has a similar structure to blockchain.   
14 See McConaghy et al. (2016) for detail. Note that this whitepaper is no longer a living document 
according to the project members, and they are now writing a new updated version which is unavailable at 
the time the authors are writing this chapter (March 2018).   
15 McConaghy and Holtzman (2015), the whitepaper of ascribe, already mentioned the outline of 
BigchainDB.   
16 See Lakshman and Malik (2010) for detail.   
17 See Rosenfeld (2012) for further detail of this approach called ‘colored coin’.  
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